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Abstract
Scholars have recently begun exploring the construction of what Sean
Farhang has termed the “litigation state” – namely, the distinctly American
way in which contemporary federal programs are enforced by means of
litigation. The attention in this literature to date has focused on why Congress
has encouraged private litigation to enforce various statutory programs. This
paper examines the emergence of a related and no less important
development – the federal government’s encouragement of state government
litigators to help enforce federal regulatory programs, especially state
attorneys general ("AGs"). Examining several decades’ worth of congressional
actions, court decisions, and federal administrative initiatives that have
empowered state AGs, this paper explores how and why Congress and other
federal institutions have placed increasing reliance on state AGs to enforce
federal law. This question has become important not only because this federal
empowerment has been a major driver of the prominent regulatory role state
AGs have taken on in recent years, but because the political dynamic
concerning state litigation differs from other aspects of the litigation state.
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Introduction
Courts and litigation play a crucial role in policymaking in the
United States, particularly as compared to other democratic political
systems. While law and legal institutions have long been important in
American politics, the relationship between litigation and policy
implementation has grown considerably stronger since the 1960s and
70s. As Sean Farhang has explained, the number of private lawsuits
relying upon federal statutory law has risen dramatically in the past
few decades. This growth is not simply a reflection of large‐scale
cultural or technological changes in American society, but has resulted
from congressional choices encouraging the use of such private
litigation as a method of regulatory enforcement of federal law.1
While the growth of private litigation has been a key part of the
new American regulatory state, it has not been the only manifestation
of this larger trend. Another key development in the politics of
litigation has been the rapid rise of litigation by state governments.
States have led increasingly coordinated litigation campaigns in areas
including environmental policy, health care, antitrust enforcement, and
consumer protection. This litigation has increasingly been used to
achieve policy and regulatory goals. The most famous example
probably remains the massive settlement state AGs reached with the
nation's largest tobacco companies in 1998, which sent billions of
dollars into state coffers and placed a variety of new regulatory
requirements on the industry.2 Since that time, entrepreneurial state
litigators including former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer
have conducted litigation campaigns targeting a variety of alleged
corporate misdoings as well as the federal government itself. Recent
high‐profile litigation campaigns have included the investigation and
eventual settlement with the nation's largest banks as part of the
foreclosure crisis as well as state‐led lawsuits against the Affordable
Care Act.3
Much like the growth of the private litigation state, the
emergence of this new set of public actors – especially the state AGs
who control nearly all state litigation – has not simply been a reflection
of broader changes in American society since the 1960s. It has
resulted largely because of the efforts of various federal institutions to
American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, (August 30-September 2, 2012). Publisher Link. This article is ©
American Political Science Association and permission has been granted for this version to appear in ePublications@Marquette. American Political Science Association does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from American Political Science Association.

2

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

make state litigators a partner in the pursuit of federal regulatory
objectives. The federal empowerment of state litigation has taken
various forms, including congressional and judicial expansions of state
standing to sue, federal grants to assist state enforcement, and federal
agency partnerships with states aimed at building state litigation
capacity. At the heart of this federal empowerment has been the
reliance on cooperative federalism, which emphasizes the need of
state and federal authorities working together to solve common
problems. The cooperative model is a particularly important part of the
new social regulation of the 1960s and 70s, which targeted quality of
life issues such as health care and the environment. It has been in
these area in which state litigation has played the most prominent role
in contemporary American politics.
Understanding the construction of the litigation state's public
face has become increasingly important as state AGs have emerged as
prominent actors in American regulatory politics. It is also important
because the political dynamic concerning state litigation differs from
other aspects of the litigation state. For one, Congress and the courts
have been particularly sympathetic to expanding states’ capacity to
enforce federal law through litigation even while they act to reduce the
role of private litigation. This suggests that the emergence of state
litigation as a national policymaking tool has and perhaps will continue
to avoid the sorts of attacks levied against the private litigation state.
Additionally, while the federal government has encouraged state
litigation as a way to enlist state AGs as partners in carrying out
federal regulatory schemes, one of the effects has been to establish a
powerful new set of political actors with their own often conflicting
agendas. These actors have increasingly served as opportunity points
for opponents of federal policies to challenge and reshape those
federal policies in court. Thus, the ironic result of the federal
government’s increasing AG capacity has been that state AGs have
used this congressionally‐assisted capacity building to frustrate,
challenge, and reverse congressional initiatives in recent years.
Understanding this dynamic helps to shed light on prominent recent
state‐driven litigation campaigns, including state challenges to federal
environmental and health care policy.
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The Growth of State Litigation
States have engaged in litigation since the creation of the
American republic. Indeed, the history of state attorneys general, who
are the officials tasked with representing their state's legal interests,
predates the U.S. Constitution. For much of American history,
however, state litigation was relatively limited in scope. State AGs
rarely attracted much attention nationally as they typically focused on
issues of importance to their particular state. This included their
responsibility to defend state laws and state agencies against legal
challenges, as well as enforcing provisions of state civil and criminal
statutes against alleged violators.4
However, the picture of state litigation has changed more
recently. Beginning in the 1960s and 70s, state AG offices began to
take on an increasing amount of enforcement responsibilities,
particularly issues concerning consumer protection, antitrust
enforcement, health care, and the environment. AG offices grew from
only a few attorneys and staff to larger offices containing new civil
divisions reflecting their new enforcement responsibilities. Throughout
the late 1970s and early 1980s, state AG budgets outpaced the growth
of general government spending in every state.5
As state AG offices grew in size, so did the scope of their
litigation. State litigation became increasingly coordinated across state
lines. Prior to the 1980s, such multistate litigation was rare. Beginning
in the 1980s, however, multistate litigation has become a primary tool
for states to deal with large‐scale enforcement issues across a variety
of policy areas.
The most important consequence of the emergence of multistate
litigation is that this tool has served as the primary vehicle for state
AGs to have influence over regulatory policy on a national scale.
Several of the multistate litigation campaigns waged by state AGs
have involved high‐profile concerns also being dealt with by national
political institutions, including health care, environmental policy, and
the foreclosure crisis. In some instances, state litigators have formed a
cooperative relationship with federal enforcers to conduct joint
investigations of alleged corporate malfeasance. Such investigations
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have frequently led to major settlements requiring corporate
defendants to not just pay civil and criminal penalties but to adhere to
new codes of conduct. In many other instances, however, state AGs
have employed multistate litigation as a tool to challenge the policy
priorities of the federal government.
This occurs most explicitly when state litigators bring high‐
profile lawsuits against the federal government directly, challenging
various policy choices of federal agencies. This multistate activity was
particularly prevalent throughout the 2000s in the area of
environmental law, as several mostly Democratic state AGs challenged
the Bush Administration's approach to global warming and the
regulation of air pollution from power plants and automobiles. Among
other successes in court, the state AGs spearheaded the litigation
resulting in the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark 2007 decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA, which forced the Bush Administration's
Environmental Protection Agency to address carbon dioxide emissions
under the Clean Air Act.6 Since the start of the Obama Administration,
several state AGs have employed multistate litigation to challenge
various federal policy decisions. In addition to challenging new
environmental regulations promulgated by the Lisa Jackson‐led EPA,
several state AGs helped lead the charge against the Affordable Care
Act.7
Multistate litigation has also challenged national regulatory
policy more subtly as well through large‐scale litigation against private
corporations. The vast majority of multistate investigations are never
tested in court, as the states and their corporate targets reach out‐ofcourt settlements resolving the states' allegations. These settlements
frequently contain numerous provisions reflecting the states'
regulatory aims. In what remains perhaps the most famous example,
state AGs across the country sued several of the nation's largest
tobacco firms beginning in the mid‐1990s. This effort culminated in a
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that sent more than $200 billion
to the states and created a massive new regulatory regime restricting
the sales and marketing of tobacco products.8 Among many other
restrictions, the MSA prohibited tobacco firms from targeting youth
through the use of cartoons in cigarette advertising, banned the
advertising of cigarettes in public transit facilities, and prohibited the
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use of cigarette brand names on merchandise. The MSA also created a
complicated structure of payments from the tobacco industry to states
treasuries that amounted to a new uniform national tax on tobacco
products.9 This MSA was signed only after Congress had declined to
enact a comprehensive bill attempting to regulate the industry in a
similar way.
Since the tobacco MSA, state AGs have used litigation as a
regulatory device in numerous policy areas. Former New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer, along with several other state AGs, frequently
criticized the alleged failure of the Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Bush Administration to adequately punish
financial fraud. These state officials decided to act independently by
conducting a series of litigation campaigns against national insurance
and brokerage firms based upon a variety of allegedly illegal industry
practices – efforts resulting in new codes of conduct applying across
the national insurance industry.10 Similar efforts to fill "regulatory
gaps" allegedly left open by the failure of federal policymaking
institutions have been increasingly common in numerous areas of
policy as well. The largest growth area in multistate litigation growth
area in recent years has been lawsuits against manufacturers of
pharmaceuticals. Through regulatory settlements with leading
members of the industry, state AGs have managed to institute
regulatory requirements not required of drug companies under federal
law.11
The growth of state litigation, particularly litigation with a
national regulatory focus, reflects in part a pair of interrelated societal
trends that have been an important part of politics since the 1960s.
The first is the increased focus on "post‐materialist" or "quality‐of‐life"
concerns, which include issues such as consumer protection and
environmentalism as opposed to the materialist economic concerns
that dominated the New Deal era.12 Congress, as well as state
legislatures, enacted numerous new laws dealing with these emerging
quality of life issues. Much of the growth of state AG offices in the
1960s and 70s reflected increased responsibilities placed on these
state actors to enforce these new enactments.
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The second societal trend has been the increased turn to
adversarial legalism to resolve complex issues of public policy. As
Robert Kagan has explained, Americans' reliance on litigation in the
policy process reflects the tension between the public's demand for
government action to solve problems on the one hand and the reality
of America's fragmented political system on the other. Because
political power is separated among different branches of government,
this makes government action more difficult. This in turn leads policy
advocates to seek alternative venues for achieving their policy goals,
including the courts.13
Both of these broad societal trends are important background
factors that have helped drive the growth of state litigation.
Nevertheless, these broad factors do not fully explain the emergence
of state litigation specifically, as distinct from litigation more generally.
As explained below, the development of state litigation has received a
crucial assist from various elements of the federal government that
have encouraged state AGs to take on an expanded role in national
policymaking.
Federal Empowerment of State Litigation
Litigation and Cooperative Federalism in American Regulation
The federal social legislation enacted in the 1960s and 70s
reflected concerns also being addressed in other democratic nations.
The American approach to these issues differed from the approach
taken in other industrialized democracies, however, reflecting the
peculiar institutional arrangements existing in the United States.
One characteristic of much of the American social legislation was
an emphasis on litigation as an enforcement mechanism, which both
reflected and encouraged the broader trend towards adversarial
legalism in America. Many of the new statutes empowered private
attorneys general to bring lawsuits enforcing the terms of the statutes
in court. Several of the early civil rights statutes incentivized private
litigants to bring suit against alleged violators of the statutes.14 The
Clean Air Act of 1970 built upon this approach by including a citizen
suit provision allowing "any person" to enforce the terms of the
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statute, an approach Congress adopted in several subsequent
environmental statutes as well.15 As Sean Farhang has explained, this
effort reflected broader tensions in the American system of separation
of powers. Empowering private litigants to bring suit under federal
statutes increased enforcement of federal law in a way that did not
rely upon the actions of large federal bureaucracies. In a period when
the political goals of the federal legislative and executive branches
were frequently at odds, this approach helped ensure enforcement of
federal law even when control of the federal bureaucracy (and thus
federal enforcement) was in the hands of political opponents.16
The structure of much of the social legislation enacted during
this period also reflected the fragmentation of the American political
system in another crucial way. While federal legislation increased the
authority of the federal government in areas including the environment
and health care, it also carved out an important role for the states in
policy implementation. Efforts to reduce pollution and to provide
medical services for the poor were explicitly based upon a theory of
cooperative federalism in which state and federal governments would
work together to achieve common objectives.17
The emphasis on cooperative federalism meant that states
would have to address objectives dictated by the federal government
but in a way that afforded states flexibility about how to implement
these objectives. The Clean Air Act, for example, specified a number of
minimum standards for air pollution reductions, but allowed states to
experiment with various regulatory approaches to reach these
pollution reduction targets. Most federal environmental statutes have
likewise adopted this cooperative model. The Medicaid system,
enacted in 1965 with the goal of providing health services for the poor,
is also built around a frame of cooperative federalism. The federal
government and the states jointly finance Medicaid, but states retain
the responsibility of administering the program. In areas in which
Congress has adopted a cooperative federalism approach, states have
built up regulatory bureaucracies alongside federal agencies.
The adoption of the cooperative federalism model for much of
the new social regulation was a legislative choice and not an
inevitability. European nations, facing the same demands for new
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public policies as Americans, adopted more centralized bureaucratic
means of addressing emerging quality‐of‐life problems.18 Even within
the United States, moreover, not every program was based upon the
model of cooperative federalism. Medicare, for example, was enacted
simultaneously with Medicaid but was designed to be fully funded and
administered by the federal government. The cooperative federalism
framework defining many different regulatory areas enacted during the
1960s and 70s was the product of legislative choice, and would
dramatically influence the shape of American regulation in the
contemporary era. This approach meant that states would play a
prominent role in many American national regulatory programs, in
terms of both direct regulation as well as enforcement.
The initial establishment of new statutory approach of
cooperative federalism in the 1960s and 1970s opened the door to
increased importance of state litigation in national policy, both by
making litigation an important aspect of enforcement and by explicitly
making state governments a partner in the running of various federal
regulatory regimes. Since that time, particularly from the 1990s
onward, the federal government has pushed that door further open by
explicitly empowering state litigators to conduct litigation with a
national focus. Congress, the courts, and the federal bureaucracy have
all been facilitators of state litigation, and have continued to do so
even as they have sought to reduce reliance on private litigation as a
enforcement mechanism.
Congress as Facilitator of State Litigation
The choice to adopt a cooperative model of regulation led to
many efforts to help coordinate state and federal regulation among
agencies tasked with implementing new federal regulations. Moreover,
this cooperative vision included enforcement as well as regulation.
Both Congress and federal enforcers within DOJ and other key federal
agencies saw state litigators as a potential partner to help enforce the
complex array of new programs that had been enacted in the 1960s
and 70s.
The first indication of this was contained in the citizen suit
provisions in environmental law. Citizen suit provisions, beginning with
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the Clean Air Act in 1970, allowed "any person [to] commence a civil
action on his own behalf" against private parties alleged to have
violated the law as well as the federal agency with regulatory authority
in that area.19 Although this provision did not focus on specifically
empowering state litigation, these statutes defined "any person" to
include states in addition to individuals and corporations.20 This was
different than earlier uses of citizen suit provisions in civil rights
statutes that did not explicitly include states as parties entitled to
bring suits under the law.
Beginning later in the 1970s, Congress began focusing more
specifically on state litigation as a way to help enforce federal law. The
first major federal provisions specifically empowering state litigators
were in the area of antitrust enforcement. The Hart‐Scott‐Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 authorized state AGs to sue in
federal court based on alleged antitrust violations of the Clayton Act.21
Under the law, state AGs could recover damages on behalf of the
consumers of their state allegedly caused by a civil violation of federal
antitrust law.22 Crucially, the change allowed state AGs to recover
treble damages for violations established under this statute, granting
the states the same incentive to pursue these actions that private
parties already enjoyed under the Clayton Act.23 The same Congress
also aimed to bolster state enforcement efforts by providing direct
grants to state litigators. The Crime Control Act of 1976 provided
about $25 million in grants for state antitrust enforcement
through the new State Antitrust Grant Program, which enabled twenty‐
five states to create antitrust divisions in the AGs' offices for the first
time.24
Shortly after increasing state litigation capacity to assist with
antitrust enforcement, Congress provided a significant boost to state
litigation by empowering states to deal with emerging problems with
the federal health care regime that had then been in place for about a
decade. As enacted in 1965, the original Medicaid and Medicare
programs had few controls in place to combat fraud.25 Increasingly,
this led to concerns about the existence of widespread abuse in the
system, such as so‐called "Medicaid mills" that allegedly provided
improper health care to large numbers of poor patients in order to
drive up the provider's reimbursements under the program. In
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response, Congress enacted the Medicare‐Medicaid Anti‐Fraud and
Abuse Amendments of 1977. This law granted the states considerable
resources to establish Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MFCUs) consisting
of special prosecutors specifically tasked with tackling fraud within the
government‐funded Medicaid system. After an initial three‐year period
in which the federal government covered 90% of the costs of the
MFCUs, Congress decided to make the federal funding of these units
permanent.
The grants provided by Congress proved crucial in building
capacity in the office of the AG. According to an assistant attorney
general in Virginia, the federal seed money contained in the Crime
Control Act of 1976 represented "the most important shot in the arm
that state antitrust enforcement has ever received."26 The grants
provided as part of the Medicare‐Medicaid Anti‐Fraud and Abuse
Amendments enabled states to create specialized prosecution teams,
nearly all housed within state AG offices, which conduct wide‐ranging
investigations of health care providers and pharmaceutical firms.
Today, the federal government continues to fund the majority
(typically 75%) of each state’s MFCU. The grant amounts to the states
under the MFCU program now total over $150 million, enabling these
units to employ over 1,800 staff members collectively.27
The cooperative model of enforcement embraced by Congress in
these early efforts to create a new partner in the enforcement of
federal law expanded as Congress addressed additional quality‐of‐life
issues. After enacting five provisions empowering state litigation in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, Congress began explicitly expanding the
jurisdiction of state AGs in new federal statutes, particularly in the
area of consumer protection. In the 1990s, Congress enacted eleven
new federal provisions specifically authorizing state AGs to enforce the
provisions of federal law. This approach to cooperative enforcement of
federal objectives has continued through the past decade, with an
additional sixteen provisions expanding the enforcement authority of
state litigators enacted in the 2000s. Table 1 displays several of the
most important of these empowerment statutes.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
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A subtle but significant aspect of these federal statutes is the
way in which Congress has relied upon a changing view of whom state
AGs are supposed to represent. As noted earlier, the office of the state
AG had long been viewed as representing the interests of the state in
legal matters. In other words, the client of the state AG was the state
itself. Modern congressional statutes, beginning with the Hart‐Scott‐
Rodino amendments and continuing through to today, reflect a
different conception.
The expansion of AG authority in most of the statutes listed in
Table 1 relied upon expansions of the common law power of parens
patriae (literally, "parent of the nation"). This power traces its origins
to medieval England, originally referring to the power and
responsibility of the king, through his attorney general, to represent
the interests of those unable to take care of themselves, such as
minors, "lunatics," or others under legal disability.28 Early American
courts consistently held that this common law power had flowed to
state attorneys general.29 By the beginning of the 1900s, courts began
interpreting parens patriae powers more expansively, and began to
support the idea that state AGs had the authority to sue to vindicate
the state’s "sovereign" or "quasi‐sovereign" interests in the name of all
of its citizens.30 By the post‐New Deal era, the Supreme Court had
applied parens patriae to antitrust enforcement, granting a state AG
the ability to use this common law doctrine to sue to enjoin several
allegedly anticompetitive corporate activities.31
However, later courts limited state AGs' use of parens patriae,
particularly in lawsuits seeking damages in addition to injunctions.32
Several courts expressed concern that states were trying to stretch the
doctrine as to circumvent the limitation that parens patriae be invoked
only when the states' own interests were directly implicated, as
opposed to "merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its
citizens."33 In other words, states could not act solely as
representatives of a class of injured consumers because the state itself
had not been injured. As several courts noted, Congress had already
made it easier for classes of consumers to bring lawsuits through
incentivizing private litigation, so the expansion of parens patriae was
even less justified.34
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This is when Congress began stepping in to expand state parens
patriae authority beyond what federal courts were willing to do. As
noted earlier, the Hart‐Scott‐Rodino Amendments explicitly reversed
judicial limitations of parens patriae by enabling states to use this
power to seek damages in addition to injunctions in the field of
antitrust. As one of the House sponsors put it, "since the several
States already have the right to sue as parens patriae to prevent or
repair harm to a State's quasi‐sovereign interests," the law should be
amended to "allow the States to sue as parens patriae on behalf of
their citizens or for injuries to their own general economies."35 Under
this approach of expanding parens patriae, therefore, state AGs
could sue in a representative capacity even when the state they
represented was not directly injured. Several groups outside Congress,
including the American Bar Association, raised concerns early on that
"damages to the general economy" and similar justifications for the
state exercise of parens patriae was simply too remote to damages to
the state.36 Congress proceeded despite these concerns, however, and
later built upon this innovation to grant state AGs the power to seek
damages and injunctions in a variety of areas of consumer protection.
This expansion in state AGs' parens patriae is important because
it enables state AGs to take on a wider range of litigation, much of it
serving as a stand‐in of sorts for mass class action litigation. Private
class actions, in which a small number of representative plaintiffs bring
suit on behalf of a large number of injured persons, became
considerably more common with significant revisions of Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966. One of the purposes of the
revised Rule 23, which governs the modern American class action, was
to even the playing field between injured consumers and powerful
corporations.37 By granting broader authority to state AGs to conduct
representative litigation on the behalf of consumers in their state,
Congress essentially empowered AGs to bring an equivalent to class
action litigation in a number of areas of law. I will return to this point
later in the paper.
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Federal Courts as Facilitators of State Litigation
Congress has not been alone in expanding opportunities for
state litigation. The federal judiciary has also been a source of
capacity‐building for state AGs. Through statutory interpretation of
federal law, courts have expanded the ability of states to engage in
litigation by loosening standing requirements faced by state litigators.
This has been particularly true after Congress signaled its intentions to
empower state litigators.
One of the ways courts empowered state litigation was by
allowing states to sue under citizen suit provisions even when the
statutes themselves did not mention states. As noted previously, many
of the citizen suit provisions in federal law, particularly in
environmental law, included states in the definition of the "any
persons" entitled to enforce the provisions of the statutes. In several
other areas, however, especially in federal civil rights statutes, the
definition of "persons" entitled to sue did not explicitly include states.
Nevertheless, federal courts have held that Congress "implicitly"
intended for states to have enforcement powers under these statutes.
With only a few exceptions, courts have generally allowed states to
maintain parens patriae actions to enforce federal statutes, including
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
the Fair Housing Act.38
Also crucial has been the federal courts' general approach to
state parens patriae powers, which has tracked the shift in thinking
about the purposes of attorneys general also illustrated by Congress's
expansion of this common law power. The courts have interpreted this
doctrine in a way allowing states to bring litigation even when state
interests were only loosely related to the alleged harms. In Alfred L.
Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico (1982), the leading modern Supreme
Court case describing parens patriae, the Court referenced early
twentieth century cases allowing states to sue to abate public
nuisances but noted that a state's "parens patriae interests extend well
beyond the prevention of such traditional public nuisances." While the
Court referred to the traditional rule that states invoke parens patriae
must allege more than simply injury to an identifiable group of
individual residents, the Court stated that courts considering state
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standing to sue must consider any "indirect effects of the [alleged]
injury" to determine whether the state is representing the interests of
a sufficiently substantial segment of its population as opposed to only
a small number of individuals. The three justice concurrence in the
case, written by Justice Brennan, put it more bluntly. "A State is no
ordinary litigant. As a sovereign entity, a State is entitled to assess its
needs, and decide which concerns of its citizens warrant its protection
and intervention."39
This view of parens patriae was an important shift from earlier
conceptions of what it meant for states to allege a sovereign or "quasi‐
sovereign" interest in litigation. While states still could not simply act
as stand‐ins for the interests of a few individuals, courts considerably
lowered the bar that states had to pass in order to successfully allege
that the state's interests were harmed by the defendant's conduct.
This point was not lost on some of the justices, who saw this
expansion as unwarranted. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Maryland v.
Louisiana, a case holding that states "may act as the representative of
its citizens in original actions where the injury alleged affects the
general population of a State in a substantial way," provides such a
view. "The basic problem with the Court's opinion," Rehnquist wrote,
"is that it articulates no limiting principles that would prevent this
Court from being deluged by original actions brought by States simply
in their role as consumers or on behalf of groups of their citizens as
consumers."40 Rehnquist understood that this view of parens patriae
would potentially allow states to allege damage claims having only an
attenuated connection to actual state interests.
This concern has reappeared in several policy contexts. Several
states relied upon the parens patriae doctrine in the tobacco litigation
in the late 1990s, for example, alleging that the tobacco industry
committed violations of tort law that had a detrimental impact on the
health and welfare of their states' residents. This, in turn, caused the
state injury because of increased costs to the states' Medicaid budget
to cover tobacco‐related injuries.41 This use of parens patriae raised
concerns because it involved the states using an attenuated claim of
state harm to essentially aggregate private tort claims.42 The validity
of this claim remained untested since the states' litigation was settled
before most of the state suits were resolved in court, though one
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federal court appeared to view this use of parens patriae favorably.43
Since the tobacco litigation, states have employed broad uses of
parens patriae, particularly in lawsuits against the pharmaceutical
industry. State AGs have found much success in these litigation
efforts, which, much like the tobacco litigation, typically ends in
settlements with the underlying claims remaining untested in court.44
It is perhaps not surprising that defendant companies have
chosen to settle rather than fight expansive state assertions of their
parens patriae powers, particularly since the federal courts have
continued to assist this expansion. The Supreme Court's 2007 decision
in Massachusetts v. EPA, recognized as one of the Court's most
important in the area of environmental law, was also crucially
important for its characterization of state standing. The case involved
several state AGs' challenge to the Bush Administration EPA's decision
not to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. The states
argued that the EPA's decision would contribute to climate change,
which in turn would "have serious adverse effects on human health
and the environment." The states claimed that their quasi‐sovereign
interests were involved because climate change – allegedly made more
likely by the EPA's refusal to regulate greenhouse gases – would affect
environmental conditions within the states, such as rising sea levels
causing damage to coastal property. Standing was a key aspect of the
case, particularly because the Court had long demanded that plaintiffs
demonstrate a "concrete and particularized injury that is either actual
or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and
that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury."45 The
lower court rejected the states' connection between EPA action and
alleged harms as too speculative, but the Supreme Court sided with
the states.
Echoing Justice Brennan's earlier characterization of state
litigation, Justice Stevens' opinion held that "States are not normal
litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction."46 Instead,
the majority held, states act under the ancient common law principle
of parens patriae to protect "the well being of [the] populace."47
According to the majority, this use of parens patriae was particularly
justified here because the states have a special interest when the
federal government fails to protect them. For that reason, they should
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be treated differently than private litigants. Although the Court went
on to discuss how Massachusetts met the standing requirements
applicable to all plaintiffs, it did so with the understanding that the
state was to be afforded what they called "special solicitude" in this
analysis.48
The importance of this "special solicitude" standard was noted in
Chief Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion, which argued that the
decision "recalls the previous high‐water mark of diluted standing
requirements."49 He noted that Massachusetts and the other states
were trying to act as a stand‐in for the alleged interests of states'
citizens against the federal government, under the guise of the state's
"quasi‐sovereign interests." The problem with this, Roberts argued,
was that it conflicted with the long‐standing doctrine that it is "the
United States, not the State, [which] represents the citizens as parens
patriae in their relations to the federal government."50 What the new
rule did, according to Roberts, is treat public and private
litigants differently when it comes to standing.
It is still unclear just how broadly future courts will construe the
"special solicitude" rule, though states have continued alleging broad
conceptions of state harm as a way to gain access to the courts. This
was the case in the state‐led lawsuits against the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) challenging the constitutionality of the individual mandate
provisions in the law, among other provisions. Much like they have
done in other policy contexts, the state AGs' pursued what was
essentially an aggregation of individual claims by tying their claims to
alleged sovereign interests. In the context of the ACA litigation, the
states claimed that the individual mandate violated their sovereign
interests in part because the increased enrollment in Medicaid spurred
by the individual mandate would cost the states millions of dollars in
additional Medicaid expenditures.51 This specific claim was not
addressed by any of the federal courts that ruled upon state standing
to challenge the individual mandate because those courts relied upon
other justifications for state standing offered by the states.52 When it
upheld the ACA in NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court did not
address the issue of state standing at all.53
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Nevertheless, the broader lesson in recent state litigation,
including the ACA lawsuits, is that states have latched upon
congressional and federal court expansions of state standing to
increasingly rely upon attenuated claims of state harm to bring
lawsuits representing the aggregation of individual claims. In this
sense, the client of the state AGs has been subtly transformed. While
the AGs formally maintain their role of representing the interests of
their states, they have in practice increasingly been the public face of
the interests of consumers and other individuals. This development
has been encouraged by Congress and the federal courts, both of
which have engaged in a back‐and‐forth exchange ratcheting up state
enforcement capabilities. When the courts have limited the ability of
states to being parens patriae actions, Congress expanded the doctrine
through legislation. The courts then followed Congress's lead
by expanding parens patriae powers further. When Congress has been
silent on the ability of states to sue in certain contexts, such as
enforcement of civil rights statutes, the courts have stepped in to fill
the gap in a way favorable to the states.
Federal Agencies as Facilitators of State Litigation
Even as states were gaining additional legal capacity to enforce
various areas of policy, federal regulatory agencies were also tasked
with carrying out the same federal objectives. While this overlap can
and has created tensions, federal regulatory agencies have repeatedly
expressed the importance of state litigation in policy implementation.
Much like Congress and the courts, federal agencies have engaged in
several activities that have further empowered state litigation.
First, key federal agencies have frequently supported
congressional expansions of state authority to enforce federal law. In
the congressional hearings concerning the Heart‐Scott‐Rodino Antitrust
Improvement Act, for example, the Department of Justice, which
shares federal antitrust enforcement duties with the Federal Trade
Commission, testified in favor of expanded state antitrust
enforcement.54 Likewise, the federal agencies with authority to pursue
alleged Medicaid fraud have supported expansions of state
enforcement in this area. Federal agencies with jurisdiction over
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consumer protection matters have also supported concurrent state
enforcement.55
Federal agencies have also often tried to improve relationships
with state litigators even when state AGs have expressed their
intentions to pursue stricter enforcement approaches than federal
regulators. Indeed, when tensions between state and federal
enforcement have occurred on matters of national importance, the
general response has been to increase enforcement capabilities
through cooperation, rather than attempt to preempt or displace the
states. Several AGs disagreed with the Reagan Administration's
approach to consumer protection and antitrust enforcement, for
example, believing that the Reagan Administration's FTC was much too
lax in initiating enforcement actions. Throughout the 1980s, state AGs
brought litigation aimed at filling the alleged regulatory gap.56
Nevertheless, the FTC expressed a desire for greater cooperation in
enforcement and helped the implementation of new working groups
aimed at stimulating dialogue between both sets of enforcers and
pooling enforcement resources.57
Through these avenues of cooperation, federal agencies serve to
bolster state litigation capacity. For example, since 1989 federal and
state authorities have promoted antitrust enforcement collaboration
through the Executive Working Group for Antitrust. While one of the
group's main purposes is to avoid duplication of enforcement, federal
agencies have bolstered state enforcement by providing economists
and additional attorneys to the states through the group, as well as
share information and legal documents otherwise costly to the
states.58 The FTC has also set up databases of consumer complaints
that they have made available to state AGs through another working
group concerning consumer protection issues, offering them another
"free" source of information on which to rely for potential litigation.
Indeed, this FTC database sometimes results in litigation pursued by
state AGs independently of federal enforcers.59 Federal agencies have
also offered various seminars and meetings to train state enforcement
personnel on issues like antitrust and health care, providing additional
resources for state AG enforcement.60
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Federal agencies have also placed an emphasis on cooperative
enforcement actions that have helped both sets of enforcers to pool
their resources and have also served to make state AGs a more
important part of the enforcement of federal regulatory priorities. This
federal-state partnership occurs across many areas of enforcement,
with state AGs often working in conjunction with federal regulators to
prosecute environmental, consumer protection, antitrust, and health
care cases alike. As a FTC official described their relationship with
state enforcers in the late 1990s, "the states have become our most
valuable law enforcement partners….[g]iven our smaller resources, we
all have to find ways to be more productive."61 More recently, the
Obama Administration has placed additional emphasis on including
states as partners in the enforcement of federal law. This has included
the establishment of new federal-state "strike teams" targeting alleged
violations by national pharmaceutical companies and financial firms.62
Much of the collaboration between the states and federal
agencies with concurrent regulatory jurisdiction has been encouraged
by Congress. In the Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of
1994, for example, Congress inserted a new provision requiring the
FTC to consult with state AGs to determine how the agency might best
share enforcement responsibilities with them.63 More recently, the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission established as part of the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 authorized the Commission to
refer information about potential violations of federal law to state
AGs.64
This congressional support for closer ties between federal and
state enforcers is hardly surprising, particularly since the so much of
the federal regulatory structure since the 1960s has been based upon
a framework of cooperative federalism. The commitment to concurrent
jurisdiction in the enforcement of federal law has continued as new
regulatory issues have arised, including in the areas of health care and
financial fraud. This commitment has also aligned well with the general
congressional goals in empowering state litigation, to which I now
turn.
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Explaining the Empowerment of State Litigation
Initial congressional decisions to empower state litigators
occurred at a time in which the federal government had already
enacted a great deal of social legislation and was considering various
ways of improving enforcement of these new regulatory regimes. It
also followed congressional encouragement of private lawsuits aimed
at assisting the enforcement of federal law, which included the
enactment of citizen suit provisions of the type prevalent in civil rights
and environmental statutes, as well as procedural changes making
class action lawsuits easier to bring. The impetus for the
empowerment of state litigators by various federal political institutions
in part tracks the building of the private litigation state. The
development of state litigation power has taken its own path over
time, however, as some of the reasons for why federal institutions
have fostered and sustained this particular form of litigation have
followed a different dynamic.
Legislative‐Executive Conflict
Congress's decision to encourage private litigation as a means of
enforcing federal law was in part a reflection of broader conflicts
between the legislative and executive branches. Private litigation was
a means to carry out enforcement at a time when distrust of the
bureaucracy was high, both from Democrats concerned about agencies
under‐regulation and Republicans worried about over‐regulation.65 A
similar dynamic has been a part of the empowerment of state
litigation, which Congress has viewed as ensuring that federal law
would be enforced in the face of alleged federal agency inaction.
During the debates over the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act,
which was the first in a new line of statutes beginning in 1990 to
empower state litigation, members of Congress repeatedly referred to
the FDA's alleged failures in food regulation as a reason for the
empowering an alternative set of enforcers. That state AGs had been
particularly active in bringing lawsuits against food manufacturers
during the Reagan and Bush Administrations gave members of
Congress a stronger reason to believe that state AGs could fill this
role.66
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While Congress has viewed state AGs as an ally against
recalcitrant federal agencies, federal agencies have also viewed state
AGs as an ally against Congress or future administrations. During the
1990s, for example, several state AGs and the Clinton Administration
had become frustrated at the lack of congressional action on gun
control, particularly after the Columbine school shootings in 1999. That
same year, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
announced a major lawsuit against gun manufacturers, an action
joined by several state AGs. This litigation sought settlements with the
gun industry that would create a new code of conduct in the design
and distributions of guns, an effort that resulted in a (albeit
temporary) settlement with the largest manufacturer of handguns in
the industry.67 Though members of the gun industry were the
defendants in this joint federal‐state litigation, the true target were the
members of Congress who had failed to enact a similar code of
conduct through legislative channels.68
Federal agencies have also viewed state AGs as a way to carry
over regulatory priorities into a new administration. This occurred near
the end of the Clinton Administration when the EPA and several state
AGs teamed together to pursue an innovative interpretation of the
New Source Review (NSR) provisions of the Clean Air Act. The NSR
program requires that utilities and other industrial pollution sources
planning new construction first obtain a permit specifying what
construction is allowed and what emissions limits must be met.69 Since
the program's enactment in 1977, both the EPA and industry operated
under the assumption that the NSR permitting process applied only to
major modifications and not routine maintenance and repair. In late
1999, several state AGs including New York's Eliot Spitzer used the
citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act as the basis for a lawsuit
against several of the nation's largest electric utilities, a lawsuit the
Clinton Administration later joined. The lawsuit alleged that the utilities
had violated NSR by failing to obtain pre‐construction permits, despite
the fact that the type of construction involved had long been
considered "routine maintenance."70
At its heart, this litigation involved a dispute over the proper
statutory interpretation of the Clean Air Act. It also represented an
opportunity for the Clinton Administration, along with the state AGs
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who had initiated the action, to maintain a stricter regulatory approach
to clean air stick even after a Republican administration took office. In
December 2000, once it had become clear that George W. Bush would
be the next president, the Clinton Administration and the states
entered a series of settlement agreements with several large utilities.
These settlements largely reflected the EPA's new interpretation of the
NSR process, and required the utilities to install new pollution‐
reduction equipment in order to keep operating.71 Through these
midnight regulatory settlements, the Clinton Administration's
interpretation of NSR rules were insulated from reversal by the
incoming Bush Administration. As Clinton‐era EPA Administrator Carol
Browner later recalled, she was "constantly looking for ways [to make
sure] that the things I cared about would continue even if there was a
Republican administration. Having Eliot Spitzer in the mix was one way
to do that."72
Creating Alternatives to Class Actions
The partnership between state AGs and sympathetic federal
policymakers thus in some ways mirrored the dynamics of private
litigation, particularly the ways in which state litigation could be used
to achieve enforcement of federal law even when the federal
bureaucracy was in the hands of political opponents. Given this
justification, it is perhaps clearer why political liberals would favor the
empowerment of state litigation. Much of the growth of state litigation
has occurred in an era of divided government in which either Congress
or the executive bureaucracy has been controlled by conservatives less
willing to extend the regulatory reach of government. State litigation
has been a way to bypass either Congress or the federal bureaucracy
on the way to stronger protections against alleged corporate
misconduct.
Indeed, the growth of state enforcement authority appeared to
be a way to achieve a public version of the class action, which was in
part justified on evening the playing field between individuals and the
powerful corporations that allegedly injured them. As Congress and
the federal courts helped to expand the states' parens patriae
authority to encourage state AGs to represent the interests of groups
of individuals rather than the state itself, state AG litigation has
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increasingly resembled private class action litigation. Congress itself
recognized this possibility, referring to expansions in state AG capacity
as "providing the consumer an advocate in the enforcement
process."73 This view of state AG as a consumer advocate expanded
along with the use of provisions specifically authorizing expanded state
use of its parens patriae authority in a variety of consumer protection
contexts beginning in the 1990s.
Further, state AG enforcement could be employed as a way to
circumvent some of the problems with private class actions. The
connection between private class actions and state AG enforcement
was repeatedly made during the debates over the Hart‐Scott‐Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act. Several members of Congress specifically
noted that fewer antitrust private class actions had been filed under
Rule 23 than expected, which made it difficult to ensure that small‐
scale violations of the antitrust laws were being penalized. The
disappointing results of Rule 23 class actions had occurred in part
"because of restrictive judicial interpretations of…Rule 23 and practical
problems in the proof of individual consumers' damages" under the
antitrust statutes.74 While some suggestion was made during
congressional testimony to simply allow state AGs to sue under Rule
23,75 Congress instead opted to expand parens patriae. This meant
that state AGs were not subject to the requirements of Rule 23 that
private attorneys had to follow, including notice requirements and
separate proof of individual damages.76
Conservatives and Empowerment of State Litigation
However, one curious aspect of state litigation has been the
consistent bipartisan support for the empowerment of state
enforcement. This is particularly interesting because the empowerment
of state litigation has occurred contemporaneously with growing
polarization elsewhere in the politics of litigation. The claim that
American society is overly litigious has become a common refrain, and
many policymakers have sought to reduce private litigation through
polices such as tort reform. The debate about the proper role of
litigation has become increasingly polarized, with some (particularly
Republicans) tending to characterize private litigation as driven by "out
of control plaintiffs' attorneys" while others (particularly Democrats)
American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, (August 30-September 2, 2012). Publisher Link. This article is ©
American Political Science Association and permission has been granted for this version to appear in ePublications@Marquette. American Political Science Association does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from American Political Science Association.

24

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

argue that private litigation is central to achieving justice for injured
individuals.
Given the increasingly national regulatory role state AGs have
played through their litigation, one might expect that the public
litigation state would be folded in to the broader debates in the politics
of litigation. Nevertheless, though not completely uncontroversial,
state litigation has generated a far more subdued discussion in
Congress than that surrounding private litigation. Many of the
empowerment provisions enacted by Congress were accompanied by
little or no legislative history at all in contrast to other substantive
aspects of the bills, suggesting little controversy over these provisions.
When state enforcement was mentioned, it typically garnered praise
from both Democratic and Republican members.
This is explained in part because justifications for the
empowerment of state litigation are compatible with the goals of
political conservatives as well as political liberals. Much of the social
legislation of the 1960s and 1970s was a victory for liberals seeking to
extend the federal regulatory state to address emerging problems.
Nevertheless, that so many of these new programs were based upon a
cooperative federalism was a reflection of the continuing vitality of
American federalism. Conservatives came to embrace the basic
premises of cooperative federalism as a way to simultaneously avoid
rejecting the (popular) general goals of the new social legislation while
preventing further nationalization of regulatory policy. President
Nixon's "New Federalism" sought to bring states back in to the
management of government programs, in part as a way to loosen
Democratic Party dominance of the national bureaucracy. President
Reagan took this a step further, arguing for a shift of governmental
functions to the states because "the Federal Government is
overloaded...having assumed more responsibilities than it can properly
manage."77 By the 1990s, conservative Republicans in particular had
seized the mantle of state's rights. House Speaker Newt Gingrich
articulated an agenda of "devolution" of governmental functions to the
states, arguing, "We have to decentralize power out of Washington
D.C., and disperse power."78 Providing greater regulatory and
enforcement authority to the states was a way to accomplish a
decentralized enforcement regime.
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Further, once the cooperative federalism system was in place –
a system enacted in part because of a bipartisan commitment to
maintaining a strong role for states in the federal system – it seemed
logical and politically neutral to try to find ways to make cooperative
enforcement more efficient. This justification appears often in the
congressional history surrounding state empowerment provisions. Key
to increasing state antitrust capacity in the early empowerment
statutes was "the promotion of cooperation in antitrust enforcement
between the States and the federal government."79 Congress required
the federal DOJ to share investigative files with state AGs concerning
antitrust enforcement under the guise of ensuring that the "Federal
Government cooperate fully with State antitrust enforcers." Likewise,
the increase in state investigative authority achieved with the
Medicare‐Medicaid Anti‐Fraud and Abuse Amendments was aimed at
encouraging more cooperation between state and federal enforcement
personnel.80
As with private litigation, state litigation also benefited as a way
to achieve a stable enforcement regime at relatively little cost to the
federal government. Members of Congress advocating the
empowerment provisions enacted in the 1970s noted that these
provisions "strongly [support] the development of 'in house' State
antitrust capabilities" that would eventually require no expenditure of
additional Federal funds.81 Likewise, concerned that states did not
have adequate incentives to fight fraud in the government health care
system, members of Congress hoped that providing additional
investigative authority to states would "enable States to establish
effective investigative entities and expand existing efforts."82 The
testimony surrounding the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act noted
that the FDA itself admitted it did not have the resources available to
fully enforce federal statutes and that "in an era of dwindling Federal
resources, the Federal Government should encourage as much
participation as possible from State enforcement authorities."83
Particularly for conservatives, empowering states as partners in
the oversight of federal regulatory programs can be a way to claim
that they are doing what they can to tackle "waste, fraud, and abuse"
in burgeoning programs run in part by the federal government. The
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Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ("DRA"), enacted on a near party‐line
vote by a Republican Congress and signed into law by George W.
Bush, illustrates the continuing vitality of the "fighting fraud" rationale
for empowering state litigation. The DRA made several changes to
major government programs with the purpose of reducing federal
outlays, including a number of changes to Medicaid. One of these
changes provided significantly more incentive for states to bring
lawsuits alleging fraud in the Medicaid system.84
As noted earlier, the largest growth area in contemporary
multistate litigation has been lawsuits alleging that health care
providers and pharmaceutical companies engaged in Medicaid fraud.
Most of this litigation is predicated upon the False Claims Act, which
prohibits any entity from knowingly presenting fraudulent claims for
government payment. When an investigation results in a multistate
settlement, which is by far the most common result, the proceeds of
the settlement are distributed both to the states and the federal
government due to the joint federal‐state nature of the Medicaid
program. The DRA incentivized state involvement in Medicaid fraud
litigation by providing financial incentives for states to enact and
strengthen state equivalents to the federal False Claims Act.
Specifically, states enacting qualified state-level False Claims Acts
would recover a greater share of Medicaid recoveries in FCA
settlements, thereby keeping a portion of the settlements that would
otherwise be due to the federal government. To date, thirty states
have now enacted state‐level FCAs.85
Republicans praised these provisions as a method of
"encouraging States to aggressively pursue Medicaid fraud" helping
U.S. taxpayers "to recover the billions of dollars stolen through fraud
every year."86 As Senator John McCain put it, greater state
enforcement would be a way to attack "wasteful and unnecessary"
government spending.87 The characterization of these provisions as
"fighting fraud" helped insulate the policy from industry concerns that
they would result in "unprecedented, overzealous investigations by
regulators and law enforcement officials."88 The rhetoric also aligned
well with conservative critics of the federal government who have a
political incentive to dramatize areas in which taxpayer money is
allegedly being wasted.
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Distinctions between Private and State Litigators
A further impetus for bipartisan support for the empowerment of
state litigation is that the state AGs are themselves political actors with
partisan affiliations. It is little surprise that one of the foremost
proponents of increased authority of state AGs are the state AGs
themselves. The attempt to achieve greater enforcement authority
enjoys overwhelming support among the state AGs, and bipartisan
groups of AGs have frequently sent letters to Congress defending
expansions of state enforcement authority and urging Congress not to
preempt the states.89 Because the state AGs' push for greater
empowerment has been overwhelmingly bipartisan, it can help
convince legislators on both sides of the aisle that state empowerment
will not benefit one party at the expense of the other. This dynamic
differs from than debates surrounding private litigation, particularly as
private litigation is increasingly viewed as empowering plaintiffs'
lawyers and public interest groups, both of whom have closer ties to
the Democratic Party.
This is not to say that the role of state AGs has remained wholly
uncontroversial. Some concern about the potential for ambitious state
AGs using litigation overzealously appeared in the legislative history
concerning expanding state antitrust enforcement.90 The role of state
AGs became more controversial in the late 1990s, particularly after the
tobacco settlement and a major state antitrust campaign against
Microsoft.91 Criticism of state AGs as acting with political motives has
been most prominent when the AGs' litigation target is the federal
government itself, as with the recent lawsuits against the Affordable
Care Act orchestrated by several state AGs. A similar dynamic was
seen from the other side of the political spectrum when several state
AGs sued the Bush Administration on a variety of different fronts.
Whether or not the empowerment of state litigation has
generated more controversy in recent years, however, Congress has
continued enacting state empowerment statutes. The most recent
have included some of the broadest grants of litigation authority to
date. While some of the federal statutes in the 1990s were targeted
towards certain relatively small‐scale problems, such as telemarketing,
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abortion clinics, and boxing reform, recent legislation has granting
authority to state AGs to enforce a wider array of consumer product
safety laws and financial regulations. As noted above, Republican state
AGs have generally been as supportive of this development as
Democratic AGs.
What is more, Congress and the federal courts remain
supportive of state litigation even when these institutions have tried to
reduce the quantity of private litigation. In 2005, President Bush
signed the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) into law. The purpose of
this law was to target a number of abuses that allegedly "harmed class
members with legitimate claims," and "undermined public respect for
our judicial system."92 The act aimed to curb this "abusive" private
litigation in a number of ways, including discouraging forum shopping
on the part of plaintiff attorneys by forcing more class action litigation
into federal court and curtailing "coupon settlements" in which private
class counsel are awarded significant fees but consumers receive only
coupons of limited value.
While the main purpose of CAFA was to reduce private litigation,
it contained a provision bolstering state litigation capacity. Before
private class‐action counsel can settle a case, CAFA directed private
parties to notify "the appropriate state or federal officials to allow them
to evaluate the fairness to all class members of a proposed class
action settlement," which includes providing these "appropriate state
officials" copies of the complaint, all materials filed with the complaint,
and the settlement documents themselves.93 In this context, the
"appropriate state officials" almost always refers to the state attorneys
general. The purpose of this provision was to ensure that state AGs
could step in and stop "abusive" private settlements benefiting lawyers
rather than consumers.94 What it also did, however, was grant state
AGs additional ability to comment on proposed class actions and,
most importantly, gain "easy access to information that may be used
to launch an independent investigation into the defendants for
consumer protection, fraud, Medicaid, criminal, antitrust, or other
violations."95 The provision could thus be used as a sort of alarm
system for state AGs. Indeed, this single provision was the main
reason why many state AGs came around to support
CAFA in Congress.96
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The legislative history of this provision also suggests that
Congress was also careful to preserve the existing capacity of state
AGs. During the Senate debate on the bill, a number of Senators
raised concerns that the bill would apply to litigation by state AGs in
addition to private litigants. While an amendment explicitly exempting
state AGs from the class action requirements of the bill was defeated,
it was clear that the bill’s drafters did not intend to reduce state AGs'
powers. This understanding was apparently bipartisan. For example,
Senator John Cornyn (R‐TX) noted that "it is very plain that no power
of the State attorney general is impeded by virtue of [the Act]" and
Senator Ken Salazar (D‐CO) stated "that we all understand that it is
going to have no impact on the powers and duties of the attorneys
general."97 Senator Orrin Hatch (R‐UT) further clarified that the target
of the bill was private litigation and not state litigation, remarking that
is was "perfectly clear that the bill applies only to class actions, and
not parens patriae actions."98
A similar dynamic has occurred with federal courts. Even as the
courts have moved to limit private litigation, they have taken a
different approach to public litigation led by state AGs. A pair of
significant Supreme Court cases both decided in 2011, Wal‐Mart v.
Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, have effectively made
maintaining class action lawsuits more difficult through restrictive
interpretations of Rule 23 and the preemption of state law.99 However,
the Court has been more solicitous of the states' ability to maintain
litigation campaigns. One significant example was Massachusetts v.
EPA, discussed earlier, which effectively lowered standing
requirements for states. Another was Cuomo v. Clearing House
Association (2009) in which the Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Scalia, held that federal law did not preempt the ability of states to
enforce fair lending laws against national banks.100 This holding, which
was soon after codified into law by Congress in the Dodd‐Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, opened the door for
states to take a lead role in investigating banks for their role in the
financial crisis. Federal courts have also interpreted the Class Action
Fairness Act as not applying to state litigation, thus allowing state AGs
a broader choice of venue than granted to private class actions.101
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Conclusion
One of the chief reasons for state empowerment of state
litigation was to allow greater enforcement of federal law, consistent
with the theory of cooperative federalism. The assumption has been
that state litigation is crucial to the operation of contemporary federal
regulatory programs, and federal political institutions have responded
by expanding state capacity to sue. The federal government has
achieved this objective to a degree, as empowering state governments
has enabled additional resources to carry out federal objectives.
Nevertheless, this empowerment has had effects beyond
improving cooperative federal‐state relationships. By inviting state
litigators to be a part of the federal regulatory scheme, they have
encouraged state attorneys general to set their sights higher and
become national political players through litigation campaigns. This
development has been particularly important since these public actors
are explicit about their litigation having regulatory goals, which differs
from much private litigation brought primarily for monetary reward.
Several of these regulatory goals have clashed with those of the
federal government. In many cases, state litigation has had the effect
of expanding public regulation outward by acting as a way to control
corporate activities. State AGs have also become more aggressive in
using multistate litigation and their emerging place within the federal
regulatory regime to bring lawsuits against the federal government
directly, claiming that the federal government has acted in a way that
harms the interests of the states' citizens.
The empowerment of state litigation is thus beset with a central
irony. As federal policymakers from both parties have increasingly
viewed state litigation as a way of accomplishing cooperative goals,
state AGs have increasingly used their empowered status to challenge
the priorities of federal policymakers. Rather than helping to create a
stable cooperative regime, state litigation has frequently destabilized
it. At the same time members of Congress were expressing more
concern about private litigation, it invited state AGs to increasingly
bring lawsuits resembling private class‐action litigation.
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The role of state AGs has garnered more controversy recently,
but the empowerment of state litigation continues apace due in part
because past empowerment has created various policy feedback
effects helping to entrench and expand state litigation. The
congressional invitation to state AGs to be a partner in the
enforcement of federal law set a new baseline assumption that state
litigators ought to play an important role in national politics. This
combined with Congress's provision of additional resources for states
to build up their litigation capacity, allowing states greater ability to
conduct litigation independently, especially complex and expensive
multistate litigation. This new national role for state litigators was
made more tenable by the presence of a federal regulatory structure
that, due to choices congressional choices made in the 1960s and 70s,
was based upon a model of cooperative federalism. When this
relationship began producing federal‐state conflict rather than
cooperation, both Congress and federal regulatory agencies responded
by attempting to promote greater coordination between federal and
state enforcers – and in doing so, encouraged state litigation further.
Additionally, as states became an independent force in national
politics, they were better able to advocate for the maintenance and
expansion of their authority. State AGs have testified frequently in
Congress advocating for state ability to enforce new federal laws and
discouraging federal preemption of state regulatory authority. This
effort has been overwhelmingly bipartisan, which has helped to
differentiate "neutral" state litigation with what appears to be
increasingly "politicized" private litigation. Because state AGs do not
have closer ties to one party than another – unlike plaintiffs' lawyers –
it has helped shield state litigation from the otherwise increasingly
polarized debate surrounding the politics of litigation.
The empowerment of state litigation also contains some broader
lessons about contemporary American politics. For one, it illustrates
how institutions established with one purpose can pursue results quite
at odds with the priorities of those who established the institution in
the first place. Scholars studying institutional change have noted that
one of the ways in which institutions change is through "conversion,"
or when the institution adopts "new goals, functions, or purposes."102
In the case of state litigation, federal policymakers initially viewed
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state AGs as collaborators in the enforcement of social legislation
crafted around the model of cooperative federalism. Empowerment of
state AGs thus would serve the purpose of providing additional
enforcement of federal law at little cost to the federal government and
without adding to the size of the federal bureaucracy. The functions of
state AGs partially changed, however, to include forming alliances with
some members of Congress and agencies in broader disputes within
the system of separation of powers. The state AGs also have used
their position to challenge the priorities of the federal government
itself, giving state litigation a function quite different than originally
intended.
The emergence of state litigators as nationally important
political actors is closely tied to the cooperative federalism structure of
much of the American regulatory state. This helps illustrate that the
vertical distribution of power in the American separation of powers
system does not involve a zero‐sum battle between the federal and
state governments. As Stephen Gardbaum has argued, efforts to
increase the regulatory power of the federal government during the
New Deal period was accompanied by an "unshackling of the states" to
regulate areas of social and economic life that they had previously
been unable to regulate.103 Likewise, the enactment of significant new
federal regulatory structures addressing post‐materialist issues since
the 1960s has been accompanied by an invitation to the states to help
enforce this new regime, an invitation that the states have happily
accepted. This expansion of the federal regulatory state has thus also
granted additional entrepreneurial opportunities for state‐level
actors to influence the shape of national policy.
Further, particularly as state litigators have more of an impact
on national policy, it is important to emphasize that examinations of
American state capacity demands more than the traditional focus on
centralized federal bureaucracies. Federal policymakers in the United
States have been quite creative in the ways they have increased the
reach of the state beyond classic Weberian models of implementing
government policy. Part of the innovation has been to essentially
privatize enforcement by incentivizing the role of private actors in
enforcing federal law. Another part of the story has been the shift of

American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, (August 30-September 2, 2012). Publisher Link. This article is ©
American Political Science Association and permission has been granted for this version to appear in ePublications@Marquette. American Political Science Association does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from American Political Science Association.

33

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

regulatory enforcement to different venues in the separation of powers
system, including the states and the courts.
The role of state litigation in shaping, constraining, and
extending the national regulatory state shows no signs of abating. This
expansion of state litigation has allowed state AGs to become
significant national political institutions in their own right.
Understanding this new development in the politics of litigation will
become more important as state litigation, encouraged on by federal
policymakers, continues to play an increasingly important role in
national policy.
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